In this paper, we study predictability of exchange rates and explore determinants of its dynamics over time. We model the admissible amount of predictability in two ways, each corresponding in a stylized manner to a broad class of rational currency pricing models, namely those under which the marginal currency trader can diversify away currency risk and alternative specifications under which this possibility is precluded. Under the null of Rational Expectations, we find strong evidence against the former class of models but little evidence against the latter, except that predictability itself is predictable. Our results pose a challenge to Fama's (1970) Efficient Market Hypothesis, but are consistent with microstructure models of foreign exchange markets in which a capital-constrained undiversified marginal currency trader seeks reward for total risk instead of systematic risk alone and sluggish risk capital mobility drives predictable time-variation in currency predictability. 
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Introduction
Evidence of currency predictability was initially documented in studies that sought to evaluate the profitability of technical trading rules. See, for example, Levich and Thomas (1993) , Neely, Weller and Dittmar (1997) , Gencay (1999) , LeBaron (1999) . More recent studies found diminishing profitability, e.g. Olson (2004) , Pukthuanthong, Levich and Thomas (2006) and Neely, Weller and Joshua (2009) , though the latter authors also found that newer and relatively more sophisticated rules were still profitable. Recent studies have also shown that rules that exploited the "forward premium puzzle", most notably the carry trade, generated for over a decade returns that were large and relatively uncorrelated with known risk factors. See, among others, Burnside et al. (2007) , Brunnermeir et al. (2008) , Jylha et al. (2008) and Jylha and Suominen (2010) . Overall, these studies suggest the presence of predictability, possibly itself of a predictably timevarying nature, in foreign exchange markets.
Direct or indirect attempts to explain such predictability include the work of Brennan and Xia (2006) , Burnside et al. (2007) , Lustig et al. (2008) , Hochradl and Wagner (2009) , Neely et al. (2009) , Jylha and Suominen (2010) . Such attempts, however, have either focused on the predictability exploited by specific trading rules, most prominently the carry trade except in the paper of Neely et al (2009) who consider momentum and filter rules, or they have not emphasized the possibly time-varying nature of predictability, with the notable exceptions of Neely et al (2009) and Jylha and Suominen (2010) . Our paper draws insight from this literature and especially from the paper of Jylha and Suominen (2010) , to offer a comprehensive assessment of the evolution through time of currency predictability and, more importantly, explore its determinants. That is, a key concern in our study is predictability of predictability and what drives it. We rely on the recent literature on limits to speculation, especially Jylha and Suominen (2010) , Adrian and Shin (2010) and Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) , and capital mobility, i.e. Duffie (2010) and Duffie and Strulovici (2011) .
On one hand, we find that the level of estimated currency predictability can be largely explained as the by-product of plausible temporal variation of expected returns demanded by a marginal currency trader who seeks reward for total risk, whereas it is difficult to account for it if we posit that it is systematic risk only that matters. Because of the close link between predictability and excess-volatility, this is in contrast with classical formulations of Fama's (1970) Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) but is consistent with rational expectations, and hence rational currency pricing, in the presence of "limits to speculation" as in models à la Lyon's (2001) and "speculative efficiency" à la Wagner (2009) . On the other hand, we find that predictability varies over time in a manner that depends on the availability of risk capital. This predictability of predictability cannot be easily reconciled with these models unless we posit limited risk capital mobility as in Duffie (2010) and Duffie and Strulovici (2011) or some other mechanism that may result in time-varying "limits to speculation".
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we characterize rational currency pricing and predictability under two stylized models corresponding to two broad classes of rational asset pricing models, which essentially differ with respect to whether the marginal currency trader can hold a diversified market portfolio or otherwise. In Section 3, we describe our dataset. In Section 4, we provide an empirical characterization of currency predictability by checking whether it can be rationalized in a model that allows for diversification of the marginal currency trader or otherwise. In Sections 5, 6
and 7, we study the evolution of predictability over time and the drivers of its variation, showing that short-term deviations from the level that can be rationalized by postulating an undiversified marginal currency trader are themselves predicted by the availability of risk capital. In the final Section, we summarize our main findings and offer conclusions.
Rational Currency Pricing and Marginal Currency Trader Diversification
We interpret an exchange rate as the price of a particular security, i.e. a default-free interest-bearing deposit denominated in a foreign currency, with price and payoffs expressed in terms of units of the domestic currency, i.e. the US Dollar, which in our study acts as the numeraire. For ease of exposition, we will refer to such deposits as the currencies in which they are denominated, e.g. the Canadian Dollar will be a unit deposit denominated in such currency (and funded in USD). We represent the data-generating process (DGP) of the excess-returns on a generic asset in the economy, including currencies, as follows:
Here, t I is the information set at time t and 1  t u is a zero-mean innovation, which is unpredictable with respect to the information set t I . The information set includes not only the sigma-field generated by the past of 1  t u but also all other available public and private information. Under rational valuation, the expected excess-return equals the discount rate at which the marginal investor, assumed endowed with Rational Expectations (RE), discounts the excess return . We define RE as the ability to formulate ex-ante forecasts that do not systematically diverge from ex-post Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates of the DGP. This definition is consistent with Muth's (1961) seminal article and the subsequent generalizations in Lucas (1978) and Sargent (1993) .
We focus on 'predictability-based' strategies that allow an investor endowed with RE to take advantage of discrepancies between the expected rate or return and the discount rate by exploiting the resulting predictability. We denote the excess-return on a generic member of this class of strategies as . We will characterize one such strategy later.
For the moment, we derive the implications of RE for the entire class under two alternative stylized models, namely the 'diversified marginal trader' model (DMTM, henceforth), and the 'undiversified marginal trader' model (UMTM, henceforth), each corresponding to a relatively broad class of rational currency pricing models. In both models, we assume that investors are greedy, risk-averse individuals bent on maximizing expected utility of lifetime wealth and endowed with Muth's (1961) 
When pricing excess-returns, and for realistically low levels of the risk free rate, the mean of the kernel is essentially not identified and thus it can be well approximated by setting it to unity. From (3), we thus have
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For a given set of traded assets, (3) and (4) must hold for any admissible kernel, including the kernel with minimum variance, and all strategies, including the predictability-based strategies introduced earlier. These strategies, with excess return , will be our focus from now on. The minimum-variance kernel that satisfies (3) for all traded payoffs is the marginal investor's Inter-temporal marginal Rate of Substitution (IMRS) 1 , 1  t  , which we model as a linear function 2 of a set of factors 1  t f and setting its mean equal to one (again, this is legitimate because we are working with excess-returns):
Then, from (4) and (5), we have
Here, the elements of the vector  are the coefficients of the regression of on the factors and
is a conformable vector of risk-premia.
UMTM
In the UMTM, we allow for frictions by assuming that (a) investors are capitalconstrained, in the sense that the risk capital supply curve they face is upward-sloping, and (b), in trading currencies, they face fixed transaction costs in gathering and processing information 3 , as well as limited asset divisibility 4 . These frictions all impact 1 This must be the case for every investor and for every payoff that each investor can trade. If the market is complete, the IMRSs of all investors must be the same and equal to the minimum-variance kernel that prices all assets. In incomplete but otherwise frictionless markets, this restriction applies with respect to the projections of the IMRSs onto the span of the traded asset payoffs. 2 The representative investor's IMRS will be a function of the payoff on a portfolio of risky assets that represents the efficient allocation for all investors. Such a function will be unconditionally linear (static CAPM) or non linear (e.g., higher-moment versions of the static CAPM, conditional CAPM) depending, in general, on the functional specification of the investors' utility functions and their wealth allocations. 3 Ideally, we should also consider the implications for the investors' problem of economies of scope that arise in the gathering of information. This would, however, complicate our discussion and we therefore leave it for future research. We note, however, that, to the extent that such economies of scope pertain to the gathering of information that is idiosyncratic to the currency market, possibly in a multi-currency setting a là Lyons and Moore (2009) , they would typically create additional incentives to increase the scale. For example, traders often cite the usefulness of being a large player in that this allows to "see the flows", thereby gaining an informational advantage. This creates an incentive for large dealers to develop large currency trading operations, effectively becoming market makers. See, on this mechanism, the comprehensive discussion offered by Lyons (2001) . 4 For example, in order to exploit informational advantages resulting from being able to "see the flows", currency traders must stand ready to enter large size transactions, thereby acting as market makers.
the investors' problem in the same direction, i.e. increase the optimal scale of currency trading, thus creating an entry barrier. The incumbent is, by definition, the investor who trades currencies at the margin and its risk capital is defined, as in Adrian and Shin (2010) , as "balance sheet size". We also assume that (c) fixed transaction costs are large enough and (d) capital constraints are binding enough that, due to the need to exploit economies of scale while coping with capital-constraints, this investor will prefer not to form diversified portfolios. Furthermore, for ease of argument but without loss of generality, we assume that (e) average unit fixed transaction costs and asset indivisibility are, at the incumbent's optimal scale, negligible. Thus, at such scale, the incumbent can invest at the margin in the currency strategy even though she cannot optimally hold a diversified portfolio. Then maximization of the incumbent's expected utility implies the following restriction on the currency strategy expected excess-returns:
Here, denotes the incumbent's IMRS. The right-most equality follows from the fact that is perfectly negatively correlated to the currency strategy since the latter makes up her entire portfolio. In this stylized model, the currency market is segmented from the rest of the capital market due to the entry barrier, leading to (7) 
Therefore, while in general (6) will not hold, (7) and (9) will and jointly they imply
That is, since the strategy cannot be traded at the margin by a diversified investor, we should observe a quest for reward for total risk, instead of systematic risk alone. We use (5) and (10), as well as the well known duality between the volatility of the minimumvariance kernel and the economy maximal SR, and obtain the following more practical
This can be seen as the hurdle SR that trades must offer to be entered into by proprietary traders. A higher hurdle rate would imply, for the providers of risk capital, missing out on investment opportunities that are more advantageous than those they typically undertake.
While the model is admittedly stylized, its implications are plausible. Lyons (2001) and, more recently, Hochradl and Wagner (2009) , also noted the need, by capital-constrained currency traders, to develop economies of scale and scope in the processing of information and the management of inventory risk, and argued that this leads to the emergence of the SR as the appropriate performance measure. The equilibrium SR in the left-hand side of (11) should be seen as net of all transaction costs, including the price impact of trades. As in the model of Lyons and Moore (2009) , professional currency traders will choose the optimal amount of currency mispricing to arbitrage away so as to maximize their objective function, taking into account the price impact of their own trades.
For the UMTM equilibrium to arise, the information needed for the pricing of currencies should be, at least to some extent, currency-specific, so as to generate enough incentive to specialize. Evidence provided by the microstructure literature, e.g. Lyons (2001 ), Killeen et al. (2006 and Lyons and Moore (2009) , suggests that this is likely the case in that the bulk of currency volatility is explained by order flows, typically carrying currencyspecific cash flow and discount rate information, rather than macroeconomic news or even returns on other asset classes. The acquisition costs that give rise to economies of scale pertain to both public and private information. In either case, they should be seen as more similar to the costs that Mankiw and Ricardo (2002) view as the main culprit for the slow diffusion of information ("sticky information") than to those that determine the limited-information channel problem ("noisy-information") in the model of Woodford (2001) . In fact, what matters in the context of the UMTM is that the quality of the information acquisition performed by traders depends on how much they are willing to invest in such task. As Mankiw and Ricardo (2002) put it, thinking is costly and therefore "people do it only once in a while". In their model, agents do so at random times whereas, in the UMTM, they specialize and chose whether to become undiversified currency traders, so as to achieve economies of scale in gathering and processing information, or invest in the wider capital market, thus dispensing with the need to acquire currency-specific information.
UMTM and Limited Capital Mobility
It cannot be ruled out that the incumbents, in spite of committing all their risk capital to currency trading, may still face a binding capital constraint when ( ) ( ).
Thus, in a (perhaps more realistic) version of the UMTM that allows for such possibility, SRs would exceed the bound in (10) by a non-negative amount until enough new risk capital arrives, i.e. until potential entrants decide to undertake the fixed entry cost. Due to limited capital mobility à la Duffie (2010) and Duffie and Strulovici (2011) , this may take some time and occur somewhat sluggishly, giving rise to predictable co-variation with the availability of risk-capital 6 . As a result, due to the well-known duality 7 between the coefficient of determination R 2 of predictive regressions and the (squared) SR of strategies that exploit the predictability picked up by the R 2 , predictability would be driven, in a predictable manner, by the time-varying availability of risk-capital.
From this point of view, the UMTM is also related to the work of Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) . Just like the high margin securities considered by these authors, the predictability-based strategies on which we focus absorb risk capital, and the availability of the latter determines their mispricing. Related work includes also the model put forth by Adrian, Etula et al. (2010) , who show that funding liquidity in a given currency predicts returns in that currency and the latter co-varies with the leverage of funding intermediaries. It is, however, the availability of risk capital committed to currency trading that plays the crucial role in the determination of equilibrium predictability, rather than either availability of risk capital in the wider capital market or funding liquidity.
Under the UMTM, the availability of risk capital committed to currency trading drives down excess-predictability of currency returns, i.e. deviations from the equilibrium described by (11). Availability of risk capital in the wider capital market drives instead fluctuations in the economy-wide SR, i.e. in the right-hand side of (11), whereas funding liquidity in any given currency predicts spot returns on holdings of that currency, as shown by Adrian, Etula et al. (2010) . That is, while availability of risk capital in the wider capital market determines admissible predictability under RE and the availability of funding liquidity in a given currency predicts spot returns on holdings of that currency, the availability of risk capital committed to trading of a currency predicts excesspredictability of the currency returns. 8 The other key difference between the UMTS and the models put forth by Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) and is, of course, our emphasis on total risk rather than diversifiable risk only.
Data
Our dataset includes the exchange rates against the USD and prices of front-month futures contracts, denominated in US Dollars ( (2010), our proxy for risk capital availability should also take into account a measure of leverage. It is however extremely difficult to acquire data on hedge fund leverage and therefore we use AUM alone, under the simplifying assumption that hedge fund leverage does not greatly change over time.
Tests of the DMTM and UMTM
To test the DMTM and UMTM, we check whether strategies that exploit currency predictability satisfy the restrictions in (6) and (9), respectively. For a powerful test of the RE null, the predictability-based strategies should mimic the trading action that would have been pursued by a rational trader based on her knowledge of the DGP. Obvious candidates as proxies for such strategies are technical trading rules traditionally followed by currency traders. Another approach to identifying predictability-based strategies is to derive the trading rule that would allow a rational trader to attain a given objective. One such strategy, described in Appendix A, is characterized by the goal of maximizing the case if we were to pick at will from the endless list of factors considered over time by the empirical asset pricing literature.
unconditional SR and an inter-temporal allocation akin to the "dynamic strategies" of Ferson and Siegel (2001) . It generates the largest SR attainable by exploiting the predictability of the currency under consideration. We label such strategy as a rational trading rule.
We pursue both approaches to identifying predictability-based strategies. The technical trading rules we consider are those tracked by the AFX Index, i.e. the basket of movingaverage technical trading rules used by Lequeux and Acar (1998) to track the performance of momentum currency traders, and the HML FX index used by Lustig et al. (2008) to track the performance of carry trades, based on currencies of developed economies. To construct the rational trading rules, we estimate time series of 'time-
where represents an arbitrary constant of proportionality and ̂ and are the estimated conditional mean and variance, respectively, of the excess-return. These weights, up to the scaling factor given by , represent the amount invested in the currency under consideration at time t under the rule and are a simplified version of those derived by Ferson and Siegel (2001) . 11 Intuitively, a hypothetical trading strategy based on such inter-temporal weights would amount to using a directional signal, i.e. the conditional mean combined with a volatility filter. To obtain estimates of the inputs of 11 In the formulation of Ferson and Siegel (2001) , given by equation (4) in their paper, the conditional variance of excess-returns is replaced by the sum of two terms, i.e. the squared conditional mean excessreturn and the conditional variance of its innovations. We illustrated using a simplified version for ease of exposition.
the weights formula in (11) Figure 1 , as an illustration, plots the resulting time series of weights, normalized to add up to unity, for the strategy that exploits the monthly predictability of GBP futures. We use these time-weights series and 2 bps transaction costs to construct the return of the rational trading rule for each currency futures in our sample. We also combine the rational trading rules for each currency into an equally-weighted rational trading rule. We denote its excess-return as . It should be noticed that, in constructing the rational trading rules, we exploit insample predictability. That is, following the advice of Inoue and Kilian (2004) , we estimate (12) over the entire sample period, i.e. using observations available up to time T rather than to time t only. 16 We do this to gain power against the null of RE, compared to the test based on the predictability captured by the technical trading rules (which are, of course, out-of-sample). In fact, in tests of this null, the econometrician suffers from a possibly imperfect knowledge of the information set that would have been available to professional currency traders at the time of making the investment decisions, i.e. it is possible that where denotes the econometrician's information set. In this case, as explained in Appendix B (available on-line as a web-appendix), the test suffers an essentially unquantifiable but possibly severe loss of power. For example, there is no guarantee that the momentum and carry trade technical trading rules capture all predictability, leading to a loss of power in our tests based on the out-of-sample predictability captured by these rules. The typical remedy to this problem, i.e. engaging in an extensive search across rules, would expose our inferences to the danger of data snooping. 17 Resorting to in-sample estimates of predictability, while carefully avoiding over-fitting, represents a partial way around both problems. 1988-2006 and 1988-2010 and, as shown in Table 3 , the GRS tests statistic, constructed following Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) , is highly significant for the rational trading rules. On balance, these results imply that the DMTM is rejected.
17 Estimating a different 'out-of-sample' forecasting model for each point in the sample period, each time searching over a large set of observed candidate predictive variables, raises the issue of composite hypothesis testing. Often much of the apparent power gain does not survive the "reality check" (RC) suggested by White (2000) . The RC power does approach one as the number of cases in the evaluation set grows larger (that is, the best rule is eventually detected with certainty) when there is a forecasting rule that truly beats the benchmark among the set of rules tested. In practice, however, this requires the econometrician's ability to identify the rules to include in the evaluation set and thus knowledge of I t , though the mapping of the latter onto μ t+1 needs to be estimated. Intuitively, the power of the test depends on the extent to which the rules in the set offer an improvement, in terms of the chosen loss function, over the benchmark (roughly speaking, the larger the improvement, the easier it is to detect it). This concern surfaces in the work of Hansen (2005) , who proposes a test for superior predictive ability that is less sensitive to poor and irrelevant alternatives and hence more powerful than Whites ' (2000) RC. This test is not optimal, as acknowledged by Hansen (2005) , nor could it be without knowledge of I t . 18 But in the latter case we suspect a lack of power due to the inability of our ARMA(p,q) to pick up all predictability.
Next, we turn to examining the SRs of the technical and rational rules. In Table 4 , we report both the SRs and excess-SRs. The latter are the excess of the former over a threshold consistent with the UMTM. According to the SR bound in (10), we set this threshold equal to the sample estimates of the unconditional SR, reported in Table 5 , attainable by investing in the factor-mimicking portfolios. To test for the significance of each excess-SR, we conducted a two-tailed test of the null that the difference between the squared SR of the trading rule and the square of the threshold SR is equal to zero. In the test, we used HAC standard errors constructed following Ledoit and Wolf (2008) .
Notably, as shown by the p-value of such tests reported in Table 4 , the excess-SRs are in all cases negative, implying that the SRs are lower than the SR attainable by investing in the factors, when the latter include the bond index. Also, even when the bond factor is not included, excess-SRs are in no case significantly positive and, in most cases, they are significantly negative. The lack of positive and statistically significant excess-SRs is in stark contrast with the statistically positive alphas. Taken together, and especially considering the strikingly different picture that emerges by comparing Table 2 , which focuses on 'alphas', with Table 4 , which reports SRs, our results lend support to the UMTM against the DMTM, in that they imply a marginal currency trader who 'leaves alphas on the table' but does not stand idle when the opportunity to earn a high SR presents itself.
Currency Predictability Over Time
To gain perspective on the behaviour of predictability over time, we construct for each currency a time series of predictability estimates. As a consequence of the tight link between the of predictive regressions and the (squared) SR attainable by exploiting the predictability captured by such regressions, as in Cochrane (1999) 
Therefore, the captures the portion of the rational trading rule (squared) SR directly related to predictability, i.e. the volatility of conditional mean returns, and hence the part of of greatest interest. For each currency, we thus construct times series of coefficients of determination of ARMA(p,q) predictive regressions estimated using rolling 5-year windows of monthly data from t − 60 to t. The ARMA(p,q) regressions are estimated by maximum likelihood and, when this method fails to converge, using in sequential order the Broyden, Fletcher, Goldfarb and Shanno method described in Press et al. (1988) , the simplex method and a genetic search procedure. As before, p and q are selected using the 'small sample' AIC. To expand as much as possible the period under study, we fit the selected ARMA(p,q) models to raw currency returns rather than excess-returns (i.e. raw returns adjusted by the interest differential) or currency futures returns. This is because currency exchange rate data is available for longer than both currency futures data (starting in 1987) and good quality interest rate data (missing for most of the '70) and, most importantly, adjusting returns for the interest differential has virtually no impact on estimated predictability. This is because the volatility of the interest differential is negligible relative to currency returns volatility. 19 Since each estimation window is 5-year long, the associated coefficient of determination represents an estimate of predictability from the point of view of t -60. Therefore, to obtain predictability estimates that come as close as possible to the end of the sample period considered in the paper, i.e. June 2010, we use data on currency returns until July 2011, the very last available data point at the time of conducting the analysis. Next, to isolate the component of predictability that cannot be explained under the UMTM, we first construct a measure of explained predictability under such model. The measure is the following:
Here, RRA V is an upper bound on the relative risk aversion (RRA) of the marginal currency trader and ( ) ( ) is the conditional variance of the market portfolio, i.e. the portfolio held by the potential entrant. The rationale of (13) is that, as explained in more detail by Potì and Wang (2010) and in Appendix C, its right-hand side bounds from above the variance of discount rates and therefore represents an upper bound to the variance of the kernel that prices the assets in the wider capital market. 19 For periods when interest rate data is available, we constructed predictability estimates using both raw returns and basis-adjusted excess-returns and found that indeed they are indistinguishable. As a proxy for the risk-free rate on assets denominated in the currencies included in our dataset, we use daily middle rate data on Australian Dollar and German Mark inter-bank 'call money' deposits, on Canadian Dollar and Swiss Franc Euro-market short-term deposits (provided by the Financial Times/ICAP), on inter-bank overnight deposits in GBP and the middle rate implied by Japan's Gensaki T-Bill overnight contracts (a sort of repo contract used by arbitrageurs in Japan to finance forward positions). The rate on German Mark deposits is used as a proxy for the rate at which it is possible to invest funds denominated in ECU, while the overnight Euribor is used as a proxy for the rate at which it is possible to invest Euro denominated funds. As a proxy for the US risk-free rate, we use daily data on 1 month T-Bills (yields implied by the mid-price at the close of the secondary market). The interest rate data are taken from Datastream.
Given the duality between pricing kernel volatility and the economy maximal SR, it therefore bounds from above the squared maximal SR attainable by exploiting predictability, i.e. ( ) , and hence the coefficient of determination of the corresponding predictive regression since, using (12) and the fact that ,
To operationalize the bound, we follow Potì and Wang (2010) and let . This is, conservatively, about twice the RRA implied by the US stock market equity premium, and is also right in the middle of the range for SR targets identified by Lyons (2001) . This author, while reporting that currency traders interviewed by him declared that their target SR is in the region of 100 percent per annum, suggests that a more realistic figure, net of the traders' desire to present their activity in a more positive light, is in the region of 50 percent per annum. As in Levich and Potì (2008) , our measure of excess-predictability is the difference between the in-sample coefficient of determination of the rolling predictive regressions and the bound in (13), i.e.
The BVI i,t-60 time-series, i.e. the series of the excess-predictability estimates for each currency and 'back-dated' by 5 years since this is the length of the rolling estimation 
What Drives Excess-Predictability
To test whether excess-predictability is predictable, we regress a measure of excesspredictability on variables that may explain its time-variation, most notably the availability of risk capital. More specifically, we regress t BVI on its lags, AUM, which serves as a proxy for the availability of risk capital, and other variables whose role is to control for un-modelled time-variation in risk premia and behavioural effects: 1972-2006 and 1972-2010 are reported in Table 6 and Table 7 , respectively. The Tables show that the availability of risk capital, which is proxied by AUM, is the single most important explanatory variable of the variation in our measure of excess-predictability.
The latter also displays serial correlation, picked up by the statistically significant coefficients on its four lags. In the 1971-2006 period, the sign of the trend coefficient is negative but insignificant whereas, in the 1971-2010 period that includes the recent financial market turbulence, it is significantly positive, casting doubt on the widely held view that predictability might be declining over time, and the coefficient of the AUM is insignificant only in the model that includes the VIX volatility index and the TED spread.
The coefficients of the latter, however, are insignificant and, unlike for the more parsimonious models that do not include these variables, the Durbin-Watson statistic suggests mispecification. We therefore discard the unrestricted model in Panel A.
Interestingly, comparing the estimates of the restricted specifications in Panel B with those in Panels C and D, it emerges that stock market sentiment, proxied by the sentiment index constructed by Baker and Wurgler (2006) , is a significant determinant of excesspredictability but not in the way that behavioural economics would predict. In fact, the latter views sentiment as a determinant of mispricing. As such, if we conjecture that the mispricing in currency and stock markets stem from the same economic causes, excesspredictability should be related to the absolute value of the sentiment index rather than the sentiment index itself. It is instead the latter to be significantly related to excess-predictability. Our interpretation is that the level of sentiment determines the availability of risk capital, typically more plentiful during 'good times', as shown by Adrian and Shin (2010) , and therefore is inversely related to mispricing. This is consistent with our conjecture that it is the availability of risk-capital the key determinant of the extent to which currency markets absorb mispricing, and ultimately consistent with Lyon's (2001) "limits to speculation" perspective coupled with imperfect capital mobility à la Duffie (2010) and Duffie and Strulovici (2011) . Table 8 presents estimates of the restricted model from Panel D obtained using alternative panel estimation methods, namely a fixed effect estimator, random effect, first differences (i.e., using cross-sectionally demeaned observations). While the autoregressive coefficient estimates vary depending on the estimation methodology, the estimate of the coefficient of the risk capital availability proxy is remarkably stable. This circumstance is all the more remarkable when one considers that it is beginning-of-period risk capital availability, i.e. flow of asset under management to the hedge fund industry in month t, that explains the (excess-)R 2 over the following 5 years, i.e. from month t to month t + 60. This means that risk capital availability predicts in-sample predictability.
In-Sample vs. Out-of-Sample Predictability
As a final exercise, we check whether the predictive relation between risk capital and predictability holds also for out-of-sample predictability. It is worth emphasizing, however, that in-sample and out-of-sample excess-predictability capture two very different type of mispricing relative to the RE benchmark. In-sample excess-predictability, when consistently estimated (i.e. paying attention not to over-fit the DGP), implies violation of the EMH in its strong and semi-strong form. To the contrary, out-ofsample excess-predictability implies violation of the weak-form EMH only.
Nonetheless, it is of interest to establish whether the impact of risk capital availability on predictability is confined to in-sample predictability holds with respect to out-of-sample predictability too. To do so, we used the 6 portfolios of currencies sorted according to the level of the interest rate made available for download by Lustig et al. (2011) to form an out-of-sample rational trading strategy that could be implemented in real time by the marginal currency investor. These are the same portfolios that Lustig et al. (2011) combine to form a traditional carry trade strategy benchmark (every 12 months, they form an equally weighted portfolio long in the currency with the largest interest rate and another one short the currencies with the lowest interest rate). One benefit of using these portfolios in forming the rational rules is that we will be able to directly gauge the benefit of implementing the RE-mimicking approach that underpins the rational rules. To form our out-of-sample rational trading rules, we combined the 6 currency portfolios using time-varying weights that reflect out-of-sample predictability. The weights for the ith portfolio, = 1, 2, .., 6, are a multivariate version of those in (11), that is , where is the vector of weights for the 6 currency portfolios, with elements , and denotes the (conditional) variance-covariance matrix of the portfolios returns. As before, is an arbitrary constant which is related to the amount of financial leverage. As estimates for the conditional mean and variance-covariance matrix in the expression above we used the one-month forecast generated by the estimated ARMA(p,q) models and the sample variance-covariance matrix of the portfolio returns, respectively. Both the ARMA(p,q) models and the variance-covariance matrices are estimated over 5 year rolling windows ending in t. We consider also versions of such strategy that limit the absolute value of the position in each currency portfolio to a given multiple c of the allocated capital. The return on the latter strategy, assuming 10 bps per each way trade and a limit on the position in each currency given by c = 100 percent of the allocated capital, is plotted in Figure 3 and compared with the corresponding plot for the carry trade strategy.
Out-of-sample, the relatively less restricted (i.e., with c  4) rational trading strategies offer comparable SRs 20 but much higher alphas than the traditional carry trade based on the same currency portfolios considered by Lustig et al (2011) , as summarized in Table 9 .
In fact, the alpha of the former remains positive and statistically significant even after including the latter as a factor in a performance attribution regression, implying that the carry trade does not span the rational trading strategy. The alpha of the latter, however, comes at the price of requiring the trader to take positions characterized by extreme variation over time. In practice, this means that only traders who can invest in the strategy truly at the margin would be able to reap this large alpha. To the contrary, investors who had to take non-marginal positions in such strategy would exceed any realistic VaR limit due to wild variation in the position to be taken in each currency over time. Therefore, only investors without capital-constraints can attain those alphas. These results suggest that, just like in the case of in-sample predictability, there is more downwards pressure on excess-SRs than on alphas, likely because currency traders seek reward for total risk and thus consistently with the UMTM, and also that constraints on risk-capital availability matter, consistently with the UMTM augmented by limited capital mobility.
To check whether the predictive power of risk capital holds also for out-of-sample predictability, we estimate a VAR (vector autoregression) including, among the endogenous variables, the risk-capital availability proxy and the one-month SRs of rational trading rules that exploit out-of-sample predictability of the futures on each currency. The rational trading rules are based on ARMA(p,q) models estimated using rolling windows of 5 years of monthly data on currency futures and assuming 2 bps transaction costs for each way trade. The VAR estimates are reported in Table 10 and the implied impulse responses of the SRs to shocks to AUM, based on a straightforward 'triangular' Cholesky decomposition of the error covariance matrix, are reported in Figure 4 , together with 95 percent confidence intervals constructed using a Monte Carlo integration procedure and 10,000 simulations. The figure shows that, consistently with our earlier finding, the SRs react negatively to AUM shocks, and to a statistically significant degree, either immediately or after some delay. The only exception is the reaction of the SR of the rational trading rule based on the CD1 futures, i.e. the futures on the Canadian Dollar. In any case, the effect mostly dies out after 12 months.
Conclusions and Final Remarks
In this paper, we assess the statistical and economic significance of predictability in currency returns over the period 1971-2010. Our findings imply violation of the RE/EMH under a broad class of asset rational pricing models, represented in a stylized manner by the DMTM. The case against the RE/EMH rests, however, on relatively large alphas but not on unduly large SRs. Taken together, these findings pose a challenge to the EMH but they are compatible "limits to speculation" models in which a capital-constrained marginal trader, as in the UMTM, holds undiversified portfolios of currency strategies.
This circumstance implies the emergence of the Sharpe ratio as the relevant risk-reward measure. Excess-predictability, however, is time-varying and predicted by risk-capital availability, consistently with recent theories on limited mobility of risk capital put forth by Duffie (2010) and Duffie and Strulovici (2011) . A concurrent effect might be learning, as in Lo's (2004) AMH, possibly coupled with un-modelled microstructure effects or outright investors' error. Attempts to discriminate between these possibilities would be a valuable extension of this work. This would require a more detailed structural model of exchange rate determination, characterized, at a minimum, by the presence of capitalconstrained marginal traders and a plausible learning scheme. Notes. This Figure plots the time-varying weights of the rational trading rules that exploit the predictability of monthly returns on the British Pound futures traded at the CME, based on estimates from an ARMA(p,q) model, with p and q selected using the AIC. The weights are rescaled in such a way that they add up to 1 over the 1992-2010 sample period. Lustig et al.) , and the rational trading rules, together with their t-statistics and corresponding p-values (both in brackets) based on HAC standard errors. The hypothesized level of transaction costs is two basis points per each way transaction. The predictive model for the rational trading rules is ARMA(p,q) with p and q selected by the 'small sample' AIC. The data frequency of the underlying return series is monthly. The performance attribution models are the Fama and French 3-factor model and the same model augmented by a bond factor mimicking an investment in the bond portfolio tracked by the Salomon US index known as "BIG". Lustig et al.) , and the rational trading rules. The predictive model for constructing the latter is ARMA(p,q) with p and q selected by the AIC. In the other rows, the Fama and French (1996) market, size and book-to-market factor mimicking portfolios and in these same portfolios augmented by the bond portfolio tracked by the Salomon US bond index "Big". Notes. This figure plots the return on the rational trading strategy denoted by LIMNETAVG and constructed by optimally dynamically rebalancing a portfolio made up of the 6 portfolios of currencies sorted according to the level of the interest rate constructed and made available for download by Lustig et al. (2011) , as well as the return on the carry trade strategy, denoted by HML_fx, formed by the same authors using these currency portfolios. The assumed level of transaction costs is 10 bps per each way trade and positions in each currency portfolio are limited in absolute value to 100 percent of allocated capital. 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Notes. This table reports percentage annualized SRs, alphas and factor loadings of rational trading strategies based on the currency portfolios considered by Lustig et al (2011) and on the carry trade strategy constructed by the same authors using such currency portfolios. The rational trading strategies are constructed by rebalancing the same portfolios based on time-varying weights that reflect the out-of-sample predictability picked by ARMA(p,q) models, where p and q are selected using the small sample version of the AIC, and subject to a given limit on the position taken in each currency portfolio. The limit is specified by c, reported in the first column, as a multiple of the allocated capital. The annualized SR of the latter over the same period, i.e. 1988-2010 , is 57.63 percent. The factors are the Fama and French factor-mimicking portfolios augmented by the carry trade strategy considered by Lustig et al. (2011) . Notes. This figure reports the impulse responses to percentage capital flow shocks of the squared out-of-sample SRs of the rational trading rules based on the predictability of the indicated currencies. The impulse responses are based on a VAR(1) with including a constant, the percentage flow of asset under management in the hedge fund industry (AUM) and the out-of-sample SRs of the indicated currencies. The sample period is 1992-2010 and the data frequency is monthly. The out-of-sample SRs are those of the strategies that exploit the predictability captured by an ARMA(p,q) where p and q are selected using the small sample version of the AIC. Confidence intervals are constructed using a Monte Carlo integration procedure.
Figure 3 Out-of-Sample Rational Trading Rules vs Carry Trade

